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Abstract 
 
This article starts with a profile of African agricultural trade. Using the pre-release version 9.2 of 
the GTAP database, we then show that the results for tariff elimination on intra-African trade are 
promising, but these tariff barriers are not as significant as the various trade-related barriers 
outside of tariffs. Impressive results were forecast by simulating both a 50% reduction in what can 
be considered traditional non-tariff barriers and a modest 20% reduction in the costs associated 
with transit time delays at customs, terminals and internal land transportation. Gains from tariff 
elimination, non-tariff barrier reductions and time in transit cost reductions are likely to be 
cumulative and would generate very large gains to Africa. The policy implications are clear: while 
cooperation will enhance the gains, much of the benefits will result from unilateral actions and 
regional cooperation that does not need the long and drawn-out processes associated with FTA 
negotiations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this article is to explore the benefits to African agricultural trade, and in particular 
intra-African agricultural trade, of reducing trade barriers. These barriers include both the 
traditional tariff barriers and, more importantly, the non-tariff barriers inhibiting agricultural trade. 
To this end we provide a background to recent African and specifically intra-African agricultural 
trade before introducing the GTAP computer model to simulate liberalisation scenarios. These 
scenarios are intra-African tariff elimination, a 50% reduction in ‘traditional’ non-tariff measures, 
and a reduction in time in transit costs associated with intra-African imports.  
 
This section examines the big picture for African and particularly intra-African agricultural trade 
over recent periods, up to and including 2013. The data is sourced from the International Trade 
Centre (ITC), and we caution that some of the big-picture data may be inconsistent for various 
reasons, such as non-reporting and the use of mirror (partner) data, since some African countries do 
not report to the ITC. Indeed, the ITC specifically warns against using their data for intra-African 
trade. There is, however, no better bilateral trade data source, notwithstanding the ITC limitations. 
  
Agriculture is defined according to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) definition, covering HS 
Chapters 01 through to and including HS 24, with the exception of Chapter 03 (fish products) and 
the fisheries products from HS 16. In addition, there are selections from later HS chapters that 
include products such as casein, hides and skins, wool and cotton. This definition differs from that 
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used in the GTAP model in the next section, but at these aggregated levels this is not regarded as 
important. 
 
2. Africa’s agricultural trade 
 
Table 1 shows African agricultural exports to the rest of the world since 2009. Proportionately, 
African exports were relatively stable, at between 3.6% and 4.1% of global agricultural exports. The 
main exporters in 2013 were South Africa, Ghana and Egypt, with the five largest exporters 
responsible for over half of all exports, and the largest eight responsible for almost two thirds in 
2013. 
 
Table 1: African agricultural exports to the rest of the world, 2009–2013 
Exporters 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Cumulative 
share of Africa 
(2013) (%) 
% from Africa 3.7 3.8 3.7 4.1 3.6  
 $ million  
World 998 633 1 132 689 1 379 730 1 400 248 1 455 656  
Africa 36 976 43 526 50 697 57 382 52 796 100.00 
South Africa 5 324 8 079 8 850 8 648 9 182 17.39 
Ghana 1 301 1 136 3 688 5 660 5 522 27.85 
Egypt 4 692 5 419 5 588 4 958 5 447 38.17 
Côte d'Ivoire 4 907 5 138 5 457 5 024 4 720 47.11 
Morocco 2 621 2 778 3 040 2 966 3 387 53.53 
Kenya 2 490 2 921 3 171 2 885 2 785 58.81 
Ethiopia 1 355 1 907 2 217 2 456 2 225 63.02 
Tunisia 1 292 1 263 1 752 1 591 1 621 66.09 
Tanzania 816 990 967 1 576 1 338 68.62 
Uganda 778 842 1 179 1 226 1 333 71.14 
 
Table 2 shows Africa’s agricultural imports. The continent’s share of global imports seems to have 
peaked at 6.9% in 2009, and was 5.8% in 2013. The main importers were Egypt, Algeria and South 
Africa, who together were responsible for more than a third of imports into the continent – in all 
three cases wheat was the major import item. Agricultural imports into the continent show a similar 
concentration pattern as exports, with the top five countries responsible for half of all imports and 
the top eight for almost two thirds. Nigeria, the largest agricultural producer on the continent, is 
conspicuously absent from the list of top 10 exporters,1 but does appear among the top five 
importers. Egypt and South Africa (the second and third largest producers) are amongst the top 
three exporters and importers. 
 
The focus of this paper is on intra-African agricultural trade. To this end, Table 3 shows that intra-
African agricultural exports constituted between a fifth and a quarter of total African exports over 
this period. The main intra-African exporters in 2013 were South Africa, Egypt and Uganda, with 
Nigeria once again conspicuous by its absence. As expected, the largest exporters concentrate on 
the markets closest to them. The main South African agricultural exports to Africa were beverages, 
cereals, sugars and miscellaneous edible products, with the main destinations being Namibia, 
Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Egypt’s main exports were sugars, processed vegetables, 
fresh vegetables and dairy products, mainly to Libya, Sudan (both North and South), Morocco and 
Algeria.  
 
                                                            
1 Nigerian trade was not reported by the ITC for 2013, whereas the importers were reported as partner exports to 
Nigeria (mirror data). This highlights the problems with intra-African trade data and emphasises that caution must be 
used in the interpretation of the data.  
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Table 2: African agricultural imports from the rest of the world, 2009–2013 
Importers 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Cumulative 
share of Africa 
(2013) (%) 
% from Africa 5.2% 5.5% 6.9% 6.2% 5.8%  
 $ million  
World 1 026 345 1 149 354 1 410 134 1 409 945 1 481 830  
Africa 53 346 63 186 96 962 87 880 86 348 100.00 
Egypt 8 180 10 618 15 299 15 914 14 718 17.04 
Algeria 6 449 6 712 10 824 10 075 10 522 29.23 
South Africa 4 315 5 682 7 196 7 592 6 947 37.28 
Morocco 4 336 4 729 6 393 6 273 5 557 43.47 
Nigeria 3 420 3 776 18 981 6 901 5 539 50.13 
Libya 1 513 2 157 2 408 4 002 4 306 55.12 
Angola 2 458 2 723 3 755 3 925 4 264 60.06 
Tunisia 2 478 2 964 3 676 3 369 3 324 63.91 
Sudan  1 306 3 079 1 729 1 975 2 208 66.47 
Kenya 1 652 1 538 2 026 1 915 1 985 71.07 
 
Table 3: The main intra-African agricultural exporters, 2009–2013 
Exporters 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Share of intra-African exports (%) 22.84 23.62 24.62 22.43 24.4 
 $ million 
Total African exports 36 976 43 526 50 697 57 382 52 796 
Total intra-African exports 8 446 10 284 12 483 12 869 12 895 
South Africa 3 776 3 850 4 370 4 169 4 349 
Egypt 527 862 900 1 021 1 158 
Uganda 223 284 353 782 786 
Zambia 243 382 569 802 679 
Côte d'Ivoire 458 514 550 670 635 
Kenya 632 668 871 664 574 
Tunisia 388 353 843 597 555 
Ethiopia 184 304 349 568 544 
Namibia 165 542 584 510 474 
Morocco 202 212 242 327 382 
 
The main intra-African importers are shown in Table 4. Between 15.4% and 19.9% of African 
agricultural imports were sourced from other African countries in the period 2009 to 2013, with 
South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia the main importers. During 2013 the main South African 
imports were from Namibia, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Mozambique and, in order by product, were 
sugars, beverages, meat and cotton. Zimbabwe’s imports were from South Africa (68%), Zambia 
and Malawi and concentrated on cereals, food residues and fats, while Namibia’s main imports 
were beverages, sugars and cereals, with almost all (98.6%) sourced from South Africa. Libya’s 
imports are not available by product code, but were mainly from Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria. 
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Table 4: The main intra-African agricultural importers, 2009–2013 
Importers 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
% intra-African 16.7% 19.9% 15.4% 17.7% 17.1% 
 $ million 
$m intra-African 8 901 12 549 14 900 15 518 14 754 
South Africa 945 1 303 1 992 2 389 2 267 
Zimbabwe 554 686 972 1 074 847 
Namibia 4 730 801 823 786 
Libya 497 664 830 800 720 
Botswana 67 740 740 827 716 
Mozambique 381 415 479 590 664 
DRC 318 449 397 484 617 
Kenya 690 546 567 632 574 
Sudan (both) 471 704 673 525 546 
Egypt 402 554 515 507 456 
 
Table 5 provides a summary of the major African trade lines for exports and imports in 2013. Intra-
Africa exports made up 22.5% of total African agricultural exports, while the comparable share for 
imports was 20.9%. Tobacco, sugars, beverages and fats and oils were the main items traded. The 
products shown represent 50% for each of exports and imports, but note that there are 
inconsistencies in the data, such as tobacco exports being $1 796 million, while imports were a 
lesser $982 million. The rankings and values for the top four are not consistent, while there is a 
greater consistency in the lower segment of the table. 
 
Table 5: African agricultural trade by HS Chapters, 2013 
Intra-African exports Intra-African imports 
HS Product $m %share HS Product $ m %share 
Total 92 527 22.5% Total 85 836 20.9% 
Intra-Africa 20 790 of which Intra-Africa 17 929 of which 
24 Tobacco 1 796 9% 17 Sugars 1 191 7% 
17 Sugars 1 532 7% 22 Beverages 1 085 6% 
22 Beverages 1 193 6% 15 Fats & oils 1 022 6% 
15 Fats & oils 1 025 5% 24 Tobacco 982 5% 
9 Coffee, tea 1 013 5% 9 Coffee, tea 977 5% 
10 Cereals 921 4% 10 Cereals 914 5% 
7 Vegetables 805 4% 7 Vegetables 790 4% 
21 
Miscellaneous food 
preparations 801 4% 21 
Miscellaneous food 
preparations 780 4% 
11 Milling 673 3% 11 Milling 621 3% 
4 Dairy 636 3% 23 Residues 602 3% 
Subtotal 10 395 50% Subtotal 8 964 50% 
Source: GTAP database. Note that this data may differ from the ITC data used earlier, as different definitions are used. 
 
3. African integration: What are the prospects? 
 
It is common cause that intra-African trade is constrained by a lack of appropriate and functioning 
infrastructure (Longo & Sekkat 2004), by tariff and non-tariff barriers and by overlapping and 
complex regional trade blocs (Adom et al. 2010). To this end, a series of simulations were 
conducted to examine the impact of a reduction in intra-African trade barriers, using the pre-release 
version 9.2 of the GTAP database (Badri et al. 2012) and recent data sets from the World Bank and 
others on trade barriers across the African continent. The results show that the elimination of tariff 
barriers will stimulate intra-African trade, but that the reduction of non-tariff barriers will have an 
even greater positive impact.  
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A base simulation was set up to examine the trade and welfare effects of a full and comprehensive 
tariff liberalisation that sets all intra-African bilateral tariffs to zero. From that point the analysis 
was extended to a) simulate a reduction in non-tariff measures (NTMs or, interchangeably, NTBs) 
by 50% using the ad valorem equivalents for both agricultural goods and manufacturing goods as 
provided by Balistreri et al. (2014a; 2014b),2 and b) examine the implication of reducing the costs 
in transit for African goods by 20% above a benchmark of international best practice. This new 
database provides tariff equivalents for most GTAP countries. These estimates vary (and often 
widely), which therefore enables a more accurate estimate of the costs of the barriers. The range in 
the new estimates for countries of interest to this study for agricultural goods is from 0.0% in 
Rwanda to 42.5% in Kenya, while for manufacturing goods it is 0.0% in Zambia to Tanzania’s 
47.4%. These are significant differences, and in the few instances where these values are not shown 
individually we have estimated a proxy from the aggregates provided by Balistreri et al. (2014a; 
2014b).  
 
Balistreri et al. (2014a; 2014b) decomposed trade costs into three categories, namely those that can 
be lowered by (1) trade facilitation; (2) by non-tariff barriers; and (3) by the costs of barriers to 
business services. Trade facilitation addresses costs such as delays at border crossings, roadblocks 
for trucks and the necessity to pay bribes. For non-tariff barriers the focus is on licenses, quotas and 
bans; price control measures; competition restrictions; and Technical Barriers to Trade; they do not 
include customs delays. Poor business services for trade also are a problem and improvements in a 
wide range of business services, such as banking, insurance and communication, and professional 
services such as legal, auditing, engineering and computer services, would also lower trade costs. 
 
Technically the NTBs were reduced by 50% in two separate ways. This was done as we consider 
that there are two pathways from which welfare gains can result. These are (1) the distribution gains 
that can be proxied by reducing tariffs, and (2) the increases in economic efficiency that result from 
reducing barriers. To proxy the first component of half of the gains coming from the distributional 
effects of reducing tariffs we started by recalibrating the initial GTAP v 9 database to represent half 
of the World Bank’s average estimates of NTB as tariff equivalent in the database generating tariff 
revenues, and then reducing these NTB tariffs by 50% to give us an overall 25% reduction in NTBs. 
Secondly, to assess the economic efficiency component, we represented the remaining 25% 
reduction in the average of the World Bank’s NTB estimate as an increase in efficiency by 
augmenting technical change in the respective countries. Our welfare results, or equivalent variation 
(EV), therefore represent the combined effects of reducing the average NTB tariff calibrated into 
the database and the efficiency augmenting technical change. 
 
For the ‘time in transit’ analysis in simulation (3), only the data for imports into African countries 
are used in order to avoid any possible danger of double-counting gains inherent in using both days 
in transit to import and days in transit to export. The use of imports only is considered the best 
method of ensuring that the benefits accrue to those making the changes. Although only handling 
and transit times in Africa are adjusted for imports, there still will be some gains to countries 
outside of Africa in that their costs of exporting are effectively lowered, even though they will not 
get all the gains. In contrast to a tariff reduction scenario, whereby those outside of the FTA almost 
invariably lose, it is anticipated that there will be gains to all, albeit with the gains outside of Africa 
being modest. While this may result in a lower bound estimate, such an approach is consistent with 
economic theory, which generally argues for gains of liberalisation accruing to the liberalising 
country. Technically, these gains are modelled as efficiency gains to the importing country, and 
therefore the benefits will show up directly in the results as technical efficiency gains in the welfare 
decomposition.  
                                                            
2 These are World Bank estimates, which are based, in turn, on data from Kee et al. (2009). The estimates are based on 
estimates for 105 countries at the HS 6-digit level. 
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Minor (2013) shows that the ‘time to trade’ costs reflect the willingness of the importer to pay for a 
product delivered earlier, based on a comprehensive database from Hummels and Schaur (2013) 
estimating the ad valorem cost of one day saved in transit estimated for over 600 products defined 
at the HS4 level. There is significant variation in these costs by product, and these are then 
aggregated into the GTAP sectors by country, with statistical adjustments made for missing 
variables. Minor (2013) then combines this data with the World Bank’s Doing Business dataset for 
2012, showing the numbers of days to import, and maps this data to the GTAP sectors by country to 
give a tariff equivalent of import barriers to trade. Thus, even though the time in transit is the same 
for each importer by country, the ad valorem equivalents by GTAP sector are not.  
 
The results in terms of welfare gains as measured by EV in the year 2025 are as shown in Table 6, 
which shows (1) the baseline of tariff elimination across Africa for intra-African trade; (2) a 50% 
reduction in NTBs only across Africa; and (3) a 20% reduction in the time of transit for goods over 
and above a four-day Singaporean benchmark respectively. The scenario in terms of which tariff 
elimination, NTB reductions and reductions in transit costs are implemented simultaneously has not 
been modelled, as these are likely to be additive and therefore would produce very large gains for 
Africa. Rather, a conservative approach has been followed in order to emphasise the NTB and the 
costs of the delays in transit. An improvement in trade-related service barriers for Africa has also 
not been simulated for much the same reason: these results are expected to be significant and 
essentially additive to tariff reductions, NTB reductions and reductions in transit times. Importantly, 
many of the solutions to these problems are in African hands. 
 
In general, the gains from complete African integration in the form of tariff elimination are 
substantial and spread across all Africa countries except Zimbabwe,3 and a similar pattern applies to 
the Africa-wide reduction in NTB costs, with the important difference that Zimbabwe now reports 
modest gains. Those outside of Africa lose, as they are displaced through increased intra-African 
trade.  
 
The interesting outcome is from examining the benefits to Africa of reducing the costs of transit 
delays that plague much of the continent (but not much of the rest of the world). The World Bank 
and others simulate these delays and their associated costs to Africa.4 This is not the first African 
analysis using this data, as Mevel and Karingi (2012) show that, although an African-wide FTA 
would significantly contribute to increasing trade within the African continent, the removal of tariff 
barriers would not meet the political objective of doubling the share of intra-African trade by 2022. 
Meeting that objective needs actions on trade barriers such as the length of customs procedures and 
port handling. Even using a conservative 20% reduction in these costs over and above an 
international benchmark, the welfare gains are substantial and about double those from tariff 
elimination, and around the same as tariff elimination and an NTB reduction combined. These 
results support Mevel and Karingi (2012) in showing that intra-African non-tariff constraints to 
trade are at least as important, but probably more important, than actual tariff barriers. 
 
Intra-Africa tariff elimination is generally, but not always, welfare-enhancing for African countries, 
as shown in the second column of Table 6. South Africa, as is usually the case, is the biggest gainer, 
with an increase in welfare of $5.7 billion by 2025. Others to gain over a billion dollars each are 
                                                            
3 In the initial database representing the year 2011, Zimbabwe is already enjoying tariff-free access to its main trading 
partners and thus experiences preference erosion when tariffs are liberalised within Africa. In addition, Zimbabwe has 
high tariffs on imports into the country, which are reduced to zero, lowering factor prices within Zimbabwe and making 
the economy more competitive on export markets. But these lower factor prices are not enough to compensate for the 
preference erosion. 
4 The African Union Commission and Economic Commission for Africa (2012) discuss this issue in paragraphs 54 to 
59 inclusive, and again on pages 34 and 35, and Mevel and Karingi (2012) use this data in their MIRAGE model.  
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Kenya, Nigeria, the Angola/DRC aggregation, Senegal and our residual ‘rest of Africa’5 
aggregation. Although not reported here, the cells in a bilateral matrix of GTAP output show where 
each country is making gains or losses, and this highlights that many countries gain from their own 
liberalisation, as greater efficiencies flow through their economies. These countries include, for 
example, Kenya (which reforms and compacts its own inefficient sugar sector) and Nigeria, while 
Zimbabwe loses heavily from its own liberalisation. South Africa is a major gainer in secondary 
agriculture, as are Namibia, Morocco and Senegal, while the rest of Africa gains in both primary 
and secondary agriculture.  
 
NTB reductions across Africa were simulated because the focus of trade liberalisation is becoming 
more intensely spotlighted on non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The results (column 3 in Table 6) show 
that South Africa’s welfare gains of $2 690 million are only 47% the magnitude of full tariff 
elimination, but then the NTB levels are relatively low and especially so for agriculture in South 
Africa. Conversely, the gains for Tanzania are 271% of the initial tariff elimination gains, as the 
NTBs for Tanzania are extremely high. Gains to South Africa are still the highest individual country 
gains, but both Kenya and the Angolan/DRC aggregation are now very close behind, at around $2 
billion each. Several countries gained more from NTB reduction than from tariff elimination, and 
Zimbabwe managed to turn a major loss from intra-Africa tariff elimination into a gain with NTB 
reductions. Overall, the results have significant policy implications by adding further support to the 
argument that NTBs are a bigger barrier to intra-Africa trade in Africa than are tariffs.  
 
Again, many of the solutions to these problems are in African hands, as the reduction in ‘own’ 
NTBs are directly under the control of the home government. Coordinated efforts to reduce NTBs 
are the first-best option, but a lot can be gained by unilateral actions in those countries with high 
barriers. By GTAP sectors there is an emphasis on gains in agriculture for most, but not all, 
countries, as almost all of the NTBs used are higher for agriculture than they are for manufacturing. 
As the emphasis on NTBs is focused on agriculture in most countries, their elimination often leads 
to significant gains to agricultural production.  
 
  
                                                            
5 The ‘rest of Africa’ includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Guinea, Togo and the rest of North, 
Central and West Africa. Some of these countries are major agricultural exporters, and changes to their individual trade 
profiles are hidden in the aggregation. 
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Table 6: Simulation results, welfare as EV in $ million in 2025 
 Tariff elimination NTBs by 50% Time in transit by 20% 
Total Africa 17 072 18 060 30 507 
South Africa 5 742 2 690 8 519 
Botswana 68 12 376 
Namibia 463 188 173 
Swazi/Lesotho 100 61 64 
Kenya 1 289 2 117 1 122 
Tanzania 377 1 024 880 
Uganda 683 471 553 
Rwanda 301 66 141 
Egypt 518 1 422 81 
Morocco 572 489 25 
Rest east Africa 15 59 785 
Nigeria 2 031 1 399 5 112 
Angola/DRC 1 168 1 917 2 331 
Ethiopia 255 91 620 
Madagascar -1 22 38 
Malawi 41 100 213 
Mauritius 76 223 59 
Mozambique 14 44 371 
Zambia 454 232 848 
Zimbabwe -1 486 174 921 
Ghana 813 485 634 
Tunisia 357 755 49 
Senegal 1 211 703 261 
Rest of Africa 2 012 3 316 6 330 
EU -2 386 -2 667 655 
UK -364 -306 197 
USA -726 -1 037 116 
China -2 351 -2 767 506 
India -1 539 -1 395 607 
Brazil -188 -261 -4 
Russia 553 188 -571 
Rest world -2 771 -4 529 -780 
Total world 7 299 5 285 31 231 
 
The reduction in the time costs of transit examined trade facilitation by addressing the trade 
facilitation or infrastructural costs, as outlined earlier, as costs such as delays at border crossing, 
roadblocks for trucks and the necessity to pay bribes. African countries are well aware of these 
problems, and trade facilitation was the main outcome of the 2013 Bali WTO Ministerial 
Conference, with an agreement to streamline customs procedures and minimise delays at borders, 
with Africa expected to be the main beneficiary. Minor (2013) uses estimates created by Hummels 
et al. (2007) on the willingness to pay to avoid time delays to produce a database of per day ad 
valorem costs to use in GTAP. These ad valorem equivalents are then combined with the World 
Bank’s group estimates of the number of days’ delay in doing business trading across borders.6 In 
implementing the GTAP model, Singapore is used as the international best-practice benchmark of 
four days for imports. A reduction of 20% in the days over and above this benchmark for imports is 
implemented in the GTAP model. This means, for example, that a country initially taking ten days 
to import a commodity is envisaged to reduce the number of import days to (4 + (10 – 4)0.8) = 8.8 
days. 
 
                                                            
6 The World Bank’s “Doing business trading across borders” indicator series can be the found at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org 
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The data shows that Africa is particularly affected by these costs of delay in transit, even though the 
approach to measure these costs is conservative. There still is plenty of ‘slack’ in the African 
system, although there are countries in Africa that are very close to international benchmarks, thus 
proving that the potential to improve does exist. 
 
The welfare gains to Africa are substantial (right-hand column of Table 6). For South Africa they 
are some $8 519 billion in real terms, and, as is usually the case, this is the most significant result 
for both Africa and the total worldwide gain of $31 231 billion. Following close behind are large 
gains to Nigeria and the ‘rest of Africa’ aggregation. In direct contrast to the tariff elimination 
scenarios, there are gains to many of the large economies outside of Africa, as their export prices 
rise in response to more efficient transit times in Africa.  
 
As expected, almost all of the gains ‘created’ by each country accrue to that same country. This 
may in part be an artefact of the way in which the reductions have been modelled, as only changes 
in import times in transit have been addressed, whereby the benefits accrue to the importer. 
Notwithstanding these technical issues, the facts remain that (a) these gains are substantial, (b) they 
mostly accrue to the liberaliser and, (c) in only taking 20% of the costs of time over and above an 
international benchmark, we are leaving plenty of room for improvement in most African countries. 
And the gains in welfare, although concentrated in Africa, are global in nature. 
 
To address the impacts on African agriculture, the GTAP agricultural sectors have been aggregated 
into primary agriculture, secondary agriculture and sugar, given the latter’s importance in East 
Africa in particular. Table 7 shows the contributions that agriculture makes to the welfare changes 
outlined in Table 6, while Table 8 shows changes in agricultural production in selected countries.  
 
There is significant variation in the proportion that agriculture contributes to the welfare gains by 
country, as shown in Table 7. For the tariff elimination scenario, these contributions range from 2% 
in the Angola/DRC GTAP aggregation to the 57% contribution that it makes in Kenya, with several 
other countries at 25% or above. For our NTB reduction there are several countries in which 
agriculture’s contribution is around 30% or higher,7 while the lowest is Tanzania, with 7%. For the 
time in transit the contributions generally are lower, with Morocco’s 50% being the highest and 
some values reported as being under 10%. Most of these contributions are from secondary rather 
than primary agriculture, and from the tariff elimination scenario it should be noted in particular 
that there are large gains to South Africa, Kenya and Uganda from sugar tariff reforms. This is 
because South Africa now has duty-free access to the highly protected and inefficient sugar sector 
in Kenya in particular. This is consistently the outstanding result coming through in all the GTAP 
output indicators for tariff elimination across Africa.  
 
  
                                                            
7 Morocco and Kenya are examples where the NTBs were assessed as being very high for agriculture and not for 
manufacturing, whereas for Senegal the values were exactly the same for both. Therefore the outcome is not simply a 
function of the initial values, but rather the trade-weighted effects.  
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Table 7: The contribution of agriculture to welfare changes in selected African countries, $ million and % of total 
  
South 
Africa Kenya Tanzania Uganda Egypt Morocco Nigeria 
Angola/
DRC Zimbabwe Ghana Senegal 
Rest of 
Africa 
Tariff elimination on all intra-African trade 
Primary 329 44 20 17 11 12 21 36 9 64 12 353 
Secondary 1,032 130 0 51 47 273 59 -52 -474 28 405 229 
Sugar 591 558 24 103 -18 -1 11 37 -8 0 10 -10 
Ag as % 34% 57% 12% 25% 8% 50% 4% 2% 32% 11% 35% 28% 
NTB reductions of 50% across Africa 
Primary 169 221 27 24 131 18 155 102 101 66 49 461 
Secondary 412 567 29 38 235 178 141 88 -42 69 203 875 
Sugar 70 44 13 8 46 2 5 11 5 2 6 85 
Ag as % 24% 39% 7% 15% 29% 40% 22% 10% 37% 28% 37% 43% 
Time in transit reductions of 20% across Africa (above international benchmarks) 
Primary 95 45 10 9 67 1 296 135 77 22 16 252 
Secondary 79 22 64 16 116 8 683 258 59 53 19 560 
Ag as % 2% 6% 8% 6% 23% 50% 19% 17% 15% 12% 17% 13% 
Source: GTAP output, where PAgri is primary agriculture and SAgri is secondary agriculture 
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Table 8 presents the proportional changes in agricultural production in selected countries from the 
scenarios that were simulated, showing a lot of variation. Firstly, the impact of tariff elimination in 
the sugar industry is relatively high for South Africa, Kenya and Uganda, but is hardly discernible 
in the case of the reductions in NTBs or transit time. Secondly, the changes in secondary agriculture 
are generally higher than the changes in primary agriculture across the table, thus indicating that 
barriers in all three simulations (tariffs, NTBs and cost of transit time) are higher in secondary 
agriculture.  
 
Table 8: Proportional changes in agricultural production 
  
South 
Africa Kenya Uganda Nigeria 
Angola/ 
DRC Zimbabwe Senegal 
Rest of 
Africa 
Tariff elimination on all intra-Africa trade 
Primary 0.39 0.60 0.31 0.07 -0.15 1.51 -0.04 0.22 
Secondary 2.96 3.43 2.77 -0.18 -0.63 -14.67 6.29 0.09 
Sugar 26.38 -32.78 -21.43 -0.52 12.60 6.81 3.13 -1.32 
NTB reductions of 50% across Africa 
Primary 0.31 0.25 0.16 -0.03 -0.06 0.12 -0.14 0.14 
Secondary 1.25 3.29 1.52 -0.22 0.00 -5.49 3.84 0.46 
Sugar 3.37 -3.78 0.33 -0.28 0.94 0.83 3.00 0.61 
Time in transit reductions of 20% across Africa (above international benchmarks) 
Primary 0.37 0.21 0.15 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.07 
Secondary 0.81 1.15 0.76 -1.41 -0.48 0.34 0.50 -0.26 
Sugar 1.32 -0.12 -1.88 -1.18 1.35 2.29 0.70 1.15 
 
Thirdly, separate simulations, in which tariff elimination was combined with NTB reductions, 
showed that the increases in agricultural production often, but not invariably, were close to the 
additive values from each simulation separately. This was the case for South Africa, Kenya, Uganda 
and Zimbabwe, for example, but not for Nigerian primary agriculture.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The powerful result from this research is that, while the elimination of intra-African agricultural 
tariffs will boost trade and welfare on the continent, the various trade-related barriers outside of 
tariffs are more important. Specifically, these are what can be considered traditional non-tariff 
barriers and the costs associated with that particular African problem of transit time delays at 
customs, terminals and internal land transportation. While tariff elimination (or reduction) is usually 
associated with a negotiation process, reductions in non-tariff barriers and the infrastructural 
constraints generally can and should be addressed unilaterally. This is especially relevant as gains 
from reductions in these latter constraints accrue overwhelmingly to the own country, rather than to 
trade partners.  
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